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Comment
STATUTORY LIMITS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN NURSING
HOME NEGLIGENCE TORT ACTIONS: PREVENTING THE
COLLAPSE OF THE PRIVATE NURSING HOME
TERRANCE J. SHANAHAN*
INTRODUCTION

There are more "older Americans"1 than ever before, and they
are going to place burdens on the long-term care system beyond what
has ever been seen as the population grows and their percentage of
the population increases. The American Association of Retired Persons reported that there were 34.4 million "older Americans" in 1998,
accounting for 12.7% of the population.2 While the growth of the
older population slowed somewhat during the 1990's due to low birthrates during the Great Depression, the "Baby Boomer" generation will
vastly increase the older population as it reaches age sixty-five between
2010 and 2030.' It is projected that by 2010 there will be 39.4 million
"older Americans," and that by 2030 their numbers will have reached
69.4 million, comprising 20% of the population.4 As the percentage
of the population over age sixty-five increases, so to will the need to
care for those aging citizens. About seven million Americans over age
sixty-five required long-term care services in 1997.' Projections show
that approximately 10.8 million "older Americans" will be in need of
long-term care by 2030.6 The question that remains to be answered is
whether there will be enough long-term health care facilities in the
United States in the years to come to meet the demand.

Recently, lawsuits over patient care and treatment in the nation's
nursing homes have exploded.7 The result has been larger damage
* University of Maryland School of Law graduate 2002; Journal of Health Care Law &
Policy's Articles Editor 2001-2002.
1. Those Americans over the age of sixty-five.
2. See American Association of Retired Persons, A Profile of Older Americans, 1999, (November 1999) (visited Jan. 6, 2001) <http://research.aarp.org/general/profile99.pdf>.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. Natalie Graves Tucker et al., AARP Public Policy Institute Report on Long-Term Care,
(May 2000) (visited Jan. 6, 2001) <http://research.aa
6. See id.
7. See infra notes 103-108 and accompanying text.
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awards than previously seen, especially punitive damages.' Without
curbs on punitive damages, nursing homes will not be viable business
entities that will be able to meet the needs of their patients in either
the near-term or the future.
This paper will primarily consider Florida and California due to
the size of their elderly population. 9 Section I will review the recent
history of punitive damages in the United States, and attempts to curb
those damages.' ° Section II will present some recent punitive damage
awards in nursing home negligence cases that illustrate the magnitude
of the problem." Section III will examine the affect massive punitive
damage awards has on nursing homes' ability to procure liability insurance.' 2 Section V offers possible statutory solutions that meet the
industry's need for financial survival as well as the public's need for
dependable, humane, and competent treatment of its most vulnerable
citizens.t
I.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Punitive damages in the United States have a historical basis dating back to England in the 1200's.' 4 The Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive fines is based on provisions in the Magna Carta that
required that damages be proportional, reasonable, and that a sensible relationship exist between the offense and the punishment, with
the punishment not being so harsh as to preclude the offender from
having a future livelihood.' 5
A.

The Supreme Court Opens the Door to ConsideringConstitutional
Questions on Punitive Damages

Constitutional challenges to punitive damages during the 1800s
had routinely failed.1 6 This record continued essentially unaltered
until the Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Aetna Life Insurance Com-

8. See infra notes 96, 97 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 14-52 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 53-91 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 92-110 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 111-139 and accompanying text.
14. See RICHARD L. BLATTr ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES 5 (1991).
15. See id.
16. SeeThe Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. 546 (1818), Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363 (1852),
(both challenges under the Eighth Amendment), Missouri Pacific Railway Company v.
Hume, 115 U.S. 512 (1885) (Fourteenth Amendment challenge).
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pany v. La Voie.17 In Aetna, Chief Justice Burger, writing the unanimous opinion, stated that the constitutional questions that the
appellant (Aetna) raised under both the Excessive Fines Clause"8 and
the Due Process Clause 9 were important issues that should be resolved, but that it was unnecessary for the Court to reach any conclusions then.2" While the Court did not address the constitutionality of
punitive damages in Aetna, the decision opened the door to future
challenges. However, in 1988, the Court again declined to review the
constitutionality of punitive damages in Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v.
21
Crenshaw.
In Bankers Life, the Court indicated that it preferred to allow the
states to have time to craft a legislative solution, or for state courts to
rule on the state constitutionality of punitive damages.2 2 In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor articulated the belief that because
juries in Mississippi were given such unfettered discretion in determining punitive damages, there might exist a violation of the Due Process Clause.2" While reserving decision for another case as to the due
process issues, Justice O'Connor questioned the constitutionality of
allowing juries "standardless discretion" in determining punitive
damages.2 4
B.

The Court Refines Its Approach to Punitive Damages

The set of cases decided from 1991 to 1995 had a huge impact on
punitive damages. Starting in 1991 with Pacific Mutual Lfe Insurance
17. 475 U.S. 813 (1986). In Aetna, the cause of action was for failure to pay an insurance claim and bad-faith refusal to pay a claim. See id at 815. The case turned on the
failure of an Alabama Supreme Court justice to recuse himself from the case when the
decision in Aetna would have a direct impact on pending litigation of which he was a party.
See id at 815, 816. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded on the recusal issue,
and thus never reached the issue of the unconstitutionality of the $3.5 million punitive
damage award in the case. See id. at 828.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, cl. 2.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
20. See Aetna, 475 U.S. at 827.
21. 486 U.S. 71 (1988). Bankers Life was a case brought for bad-faith refusal to pay an
insurance claim for loss of a limb. See id. at 75. The jury awarded $20,000 in actual damages (the policy limit), and $1.6 million in punitive damages. Id. When appealed, the
Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision without modification which,
under Mississippi law, triggered a 15% penalty, or $243,000, added to the damages against
Bankers Life. Id. at 75,76. Justice Marshall, writing for the U.S. Supreme Court indicated
that the Court could not reach the issue of constitutionality of the size of the punitive
damages since the issue had not been raised in the initial appeal of the trial court's decision. Id.
22. See id. at 79-80.
23. See id. at 87 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
24. See id. at 88-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Company v. Haslip,2 5 the Court began to refine the parameters of punitive damage awards. In Pacific Mutual the Court indicated that the
common- law method for computing punitive damages did not in itself violate due process, but that to say that just because the imposition
of punitive damages is a long-standing tradition does not mean that
such an imposition could never be unconstitutional.2 6 The Court also
pointed out that it would be unable to draw a "mathematical bright
line" between constitutionally acceptable and unacceptable damages. 2 7 The Court went on to say that "[g] eneral concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried
to a jury properly enter into the constitutional calculus."2 8 The punitive damage award in Pacific Mutualwas more than four times greater
than the compensatory damages, causing the Court to admit that the
disparity might "be close to the line," but that the award was not lacking in objective criteria.29
Even though a punitive damage award between four and five
times greater than the compensatory award was "close to the line" in
Pacific Mutual,3" a punitive damage award that was 526 times greater
than the actual damages awarded by the jury was not found to be excessive in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.3" The Court

found that the jury could have reasonably found that TXO Production
Corporation had engaged in malicious and fraudulent behavior to recover royalties to which the plaintiff was entitled.3 2 The Court also
indicated that the ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages, while high, would have been significantly reduced had TXO's
schemes come to fruition, causing Alliance greater damages. 3
25. 499 U.S. 1 (1991). Pacific Mutual involved a denial of coverage for hospitalization
due to the agent of Pacific Mutual misappropriating the premiums, which allowed the
polcies to lapse. See id. at 5-6. Pacific Mutual was sued under the theory of respondeat
superior. See id. at 6.
26. See id. at 17-18.
27. See id. at 18.
28. Id. at 18.
29. See id. at 23.
30. See id.
31. 509 U.S. 443 (1993). In TXO, the respondent Alliance had brought suit for common-law slander of title because TXO had struck a deal with Alliance that included Alliance disgorging TXO's original payments if the land that was to be used did not have good
title. See id. at 447, 448. TXO's attorneys discovered good title to the tract of land, but
instead attempted to execute a quitclaim deed with a previous owner, then tried to obtain
an affidavit from another party in the title
chain. See id. at 449. TXO then indicated to
Alliance that it (TXO) probably had acquired the oil and gas rights to the tract of land,
and attempted a renegotiation of the royalty arrangement under false pretenses. See id.
32. See id. at 462.
33. See id. at 462.
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Punitive Damages Review Must Pass Due Process Analysis

The Court addressed the issue of judicial review of punitive damage awards in Honda Motor Co., v. Oberg.34 In Honda, the Court found
an Oregon law prohibiting judicial review of punitive damage awards
to be a violation of the Due Process Clause, distinguishing the outcome of a civil proceeding from that of a criminal trial.35 The Court
held that:
A decision to punish a tortfeasor by means of exemplary
damages is an exercise of state power that must comply with
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
common-law practice . . . and elementary considerations of
justice all support the conclusion that such a decision should
not be committed to the unreviewable discretion of a jury.3 6
D.

The Supreme Court Strikes Down an Excessive Punitive Damage Award

In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 7 the Court once again addressed a punitive damage award with a huge disparity between it and
the actual damages.3" The Court indicated that most states afford latitude to juries when awarding exemplary damages, only requiring that
those damages be reasonably necessary to reiterate legitimate state in39
terest in deterring future similar acts and punishing the act at hand.
Further, "the federal excessiveness inquiry appropriately begins with
an identification of the state interests that a punitive award is designed
to serve."4 The Court opined that only if an award can be categorized as "'grossly excessive" in relation to these [legitimate state] interests "does it enter the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due
Also, the Court refused to allow a state to
.""
".
Process Clause ..
impose sanctions for conduct that the state finds untoward, but is lawful in, and conducted in another state.4 2

34. 512 U.S. 415 (1994). Honda was a product liability action brought due to injuries
Oberg suffered while riding a Honda three-wheeled all-terrain vehicle. See id. at 418.
35. See id. at 434.
36. Id. at 434-35.
37. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). In BMW, the cause of action was for a new car being repainted before sale, then sold as new, unbeknownst to the first purchaser (Respondent
Gore). See id. at 563.
38. The punitive were 500 times larger than actual damages ($4000 in actual to $200
million in punitive). See id. at 582.
39. See id. at 568.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 572.
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Whether there is a legitimate state interest must be the first inquiry in a punitive damages question.4 3 When answered in the affirmative, those punitive damages must not be significantly greater than
the legitimate state interest identified in the initial inquiry.4 4 The
Court additionally found that the notice requirement was so fundamental to the inquiry as to be one of the "elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence."4 5 The Court
articulated a three prong test to determine whether a party had received fair notice of both the conduct that would subject him to a
given punishment, and the severity of the punishment were it
imposed.4 6
The three prong test that the Court articulated was: "the degree
of reprehensibility of the [act]; the disparity between the harm suffered by the [plaintiff] and his punitive damages award; and difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or
imposed in comparable cases."4 7 The Court opined that each of the
prongs indicates that BMW had received neither adequate notice of
the existence of such a sanction nor notice of the magnitude of the
potential sanction.4 8 The Court went on to reiterate that "our decisions in both Haslip (Pacific Mutual) and TXO endorsed the proposition that a comparison between the compensatory award and the
punitive award is significant."4 9
The Court also pointed out that the damages imposed cannot be
justified to deter future misconduct if other, less drastic, measures
were not attempted.5" Additionally, a multimillion dollar judgment
that garners the desired result for the state provides no clarity as to
whether a lesser remedy would have sufficed. 1 The Court concluded
its opinion in holding that the punitive damages assessed against
BMW, which were 500 times the compensatory damages, violated the
Due Process Clause.5 2
While BMW is a narrowly written opinion, the standards articulated have many applications. The cases to this point addressing punitive damages have all involved damages to property. It remains to be
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id. at 574.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 574-75.
BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
Id. at 581.
See id. at 584.
See id.
See id. at 585-86.
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seen how the Court will react to punitive damages in a nursing home
negligence cases with parameters similar to BMW
II.

RECENT NURSING HOME CASES INVOLVING PUNITIVE
DAMAGE AWARDS

Very often plaintiffs in nursing home negligence cases face lesser
burdens to prove their cases.5" This is the case in both California and
Florida, states with the largest and second largest populations of
"older Americans" respectively.5 4 Delany v. Baker,55 a recent California
case illustrates what defendants face when sued for neglect of an elderly patient. In Delany the Supreme Court of California found that
under section 15657 of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil
Protection Act,5 6 health care providers whose actions involve neglect
of elderly patients are not subject to the remedies for professional
negligence, but to the heightened remedies allowed under the Elder
Abuse Act.5 7 The court also concluded that if a medical professional

improperly performs a custodial function, and the function can be
considered "reckless" or done with "malice, oppression, or fraud" that
it then crosses the line beyond professional negligence and meets the
criteria under section 15657.58
In Florida, plaintiffs lawyers also have a powerful weapon at their
disposal, the Nursing Home Residents' Bill of Rights,5 9 which defines
the rights to which residents are entitled, but also allows plaintiffs to
sue without having to meet burdens imposed under negligence stan-

dards. The companion to the section on patient rights is the section
on civil enforcement 60 which provides that "punitive damages may be

reckawarded for conduct which is willful, wanton, gross or flagrant,
6
less, or consciously indifferent to the rights of the resident." '
Several Florida cases have featured massive punitive damage
awards since the Nursing Home Residents' Bill of Rights was enacted.
Beverly Enterprises-Florida,Inc. v. Spilman62 was an appeal of a judgment
53. See infra notes 56-61.
54. American Association of Retired Persons, A Profile of Older Americans, 1999, (November 1999) (visited Jan. 6, 2001) <http://research.aarp.org/general/profile99.pdf>. In
1998, California had a population over the age of 65 of over 3.5 million, while Florida had
a similar population of 2.7 million.
55. 971 P.2d 986 (Cal. 1999).
56. CAL. WELF. & INST. § 15657 (1991).
57. See Delaney, 971 P.2d at 990.
58. See id. at 993.
59. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.022 (West 1993).
60. See id. at § 400.023.
61. Id. at § 400.023 (5).
62. 661 So. 2d 867 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1995).
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awarding $719,064.02 in compensatory damages and two million dollars in punitive damages.6 3 The appellate court found that the jury
could reasonably have found that the acts and omissions of the appellant warranted an award of punitive damages. 64 Among the findings
of the trial court recorded in the appellate opinion is that "the nursing home knew when the state would come to inspect, and, on those
occasions, staffing was increased and care improved. The walls were
painted, the floors were buffed, and new linens, diapers, and towels
were provided. The linens were taken back after the inspection, however."6 5 The court also found that the appellant was liable both vicariously and directly, thus bolstering the argument for finding the
punitive damages reasonable.6 6
Another Florida case, FirstHealthcareCorporation v. Hamilton,67 involved a punitive damage award of $4.5 million 6 8 to the decedants of
Charles Barnes, who wandered away from his nursing home and

drowned in a nearby pond. 6' The court found that a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendants were "'consciously indifferent
to the rights of the patient." 7 This finding was based on evidence
that the nursing home knew the patient suffered from dementia; was
on seven medications; was prone to wander off and had done so in the
past; as well as his wife's plea to have the sliding glass door on his
room repaired so he could not egress the building." Additionally,
the evidence showed that his wife had requested a device known as a
72
wanderguard be attached to him to alert the staff when he was loose.
Noteworthy in First Healthcareis not only the size of the punitive
damage award, but that it was essentially for failure to keep constant
watch on one patient which, under Florida law, is violative of that patient's rights.7" In his succinct dissent, SeniorJudge William C. Owen
points out what was articulated by the Supreme Court in BMW-one
"indicium of excessiveness" lies in a comparison of the punitive dam-

63. See id.

64. See id. at 870.
65. Id. at 871.
66. See id. at 873.
67. 740 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1999).
68. See id. at 1196.
69. See First Healthcare Corp. v. Hamilton, 740 So. 2d 1189, 1191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th
Dist. 1999).
70. Id. at 1197.
71. See id.
72. See id.

73. See id. at 1197, 1198.
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age award and the criminal or civil penalties that could be imposed
for similar misconduct. 74 Senior Judge Owen opined,
this sum total of misconduct, occurring over a period of
twenty months while (we may assume) Mr. Barnes was otherwise properly cared for, is not legally sufficient to be an "entire want of care," nor does it rise to the level of the type of
willful and wanton misconduct equivalent to criminal manslaughter which the courts have consistently held is required
for the imposition of punitive damages. 75
Further, the Senior Judge pointed out, "I would be quite surprised if
my colleagues would, on these same facts, uphold a criminal conviction for manslaughter. 71 6 Indeed, the Supreme Court has opined that
a reviewing court engaged in determining whether punitive damages
are excessive should give "substantial deference" to legislatively imposed sanctions for similar conduct.7 7 Florida is not alone in allowing
massive punitive damages in alleged nursing home negligence cases.
A recent case in Texas involved a novel cause of action against a
nursing home. 7' The cause of action was based on the aberrant sexual behavior of a patient that was known to administrators when he
was admitted.7 9 Morris Jones was caught in the act of attempting to
rape ninety-eight- year-old Jewell Underwood in December 1996.0
Ms. Underwood's daughter walked in on the assault and stopped it,
however, ajury in Houston returned a verdict of five million dollars in
compensatory damages and sixty million dollars in punitive damages
against Healthcare Centers of Texas and Dr. Keith Rapp, who had
transferred Jones from another nursing home to the one in which Ms.
Underwood resided." Ten million dollars of the punitive damage
award was assessed against Dr. Rapp who settled for a confidential
amount.8 2 The trial court enter a judgment against Healthcare Centers for $56.66 million."
Analyzed using the standard applied in BMW, the inquiry must be
whether Healthcare Centers or an officer of the company could have
74. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 583.
75. See First Healthcare, 740 So. 2d at 1198.
76. Id.
77. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 583.
78. See Margaret Cronin Fisk, Nursing Home Facilitated the Rape of Elderly Woman, Nat'l
L.J., Feb. 28, 2000, at C14.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
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been imprisoned or faced some other civil sanction for what transpired in the case. If so, it must be determined whether that criminal
or civil sanction would be reasonably equated with the possibility of a
punitive damage award of over fifty-six million dollars.8 4 If the answer
to either question is negative, the sanction against Healthcare Centers
is a violation of Healthcare Centers' right to substantive due process.
Recently, a St. Petersburg, Florida jury awarded three million dollars in compensatory damages and seventeen million dollars in punitive damages to the estate of a man who died as a result of
substandard care. 5 The plaintiff charged that the nursing home was
below minimum standards "80% of the time" during the first thirtyfive days of Charles McCorkle's stay, and, although the jury found that
the understaffing was a violation of Mr. McCorkle's rights, it determined it was not the cause of his death.8 6 Extendicare Health Facilities, the defendant, countered that there was no understaffing during
Mr. McCorkle's stay87 and that the medical examiner ruled the cause
of Mr. McCorkle's death to be Alzheimer's Disease. 8 The plaintiff
asked for a punitive damage award that was 5.66 times the requested
amount of compensatory damages.8 9 The case was eventually settled
for some amount less than $12 million.9 °
With the exception of Spilman, each of the aforementioned cases
was decided subsequent to the decision in BMW v. Gore.9 1 In each
case the legitimate state interest seems clear, yet whether any of the
84. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 583-84.
85. See Margaret Cronin Fisk, Home's Alleged 'Under-Staffing' Policy Is An Issue ForJuy,
Nat'l L.J., Oct. 16, 2000, at A14. The case is Estate of McCorkle v. Extendicare Health
Facilities, No. 99-00815-CI-011, Fla. Cir. Ct., Pinellas County, Sept. 27, 2000.
86. See id. The jury's verdict in the case was not for negligence, but for pain and suffering. See Extendicare Hit with $20 Million Verdict On Negligence Charges, Nursing Home Litig.
Rep., Oct. 20, 2000, Vol. 3, No. 1, at 3. Benny Lazara Jr. of Wilkes & McHugh, who represented the estate, said the verdict is "reportedly the largest verdict in the state in an eldercare case..." See id. The award in the McCorkle case tops a $15.2 million award Lazara won
in a case last year, Butler v. LCA OperationalHolding Co., No. 96-7862, Fla. Cir. Ct., Hillsborough County, Mar. 25, 1999. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See supra note 85.
90. See David Sommer, Pact Trims Jury Award Against Nursing Home, TAMPA TRIB., Jan.
25, 2001, at 3. In an interesting twist to the case, the aunt who sued on behalf of McCorkle's estate turned out not to be his only heir. Id. McCorkle's adopted, estranged son, a
trucker living in Georgia, was tracked down by private investigators, and is entitled to all
the proceeds of the trial. Id. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., which once owned over
30 nursing homes in Florida has ceased doing business there according to Mel Rhinelander, Extendicare's Chief Operating Officer. Id. " Rhinelander predicted that by the end
of this year, no nursing home [in Florida] will be able to get [liability] insurance." Id.
91. BMWv. Gore was decided on May 20, 1996.
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punitive damages awards pass muster under the standards articulated
in BMW is arguable. Additionally, whether the constitutionality of
these massive awards in personal injury or elderly neglect cases isjusticiable under current notions about punitive damages remains to be
decided. Regardless of the ultimate outcome of any of these cases, it
is becoming increasingly difficult to stay in business for for-profit nursing homes.
III.

THE EFFECT THAT MASSIVE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AwARDS HAVE ON
LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE

According to Best's Insurance News, the lack of options for nursing
homes to afford, retain or find liability insurance has reached a crisis
in several states including Florida, Texas and Pennsylvania.9 2 Of seventy-nine insurers surveyed by the Florida Department of Insurance,
seventeen are currently writing coverage, but six of them wrote no
policies in 2000, five only wrote one policy, and two wrote two policies,
with the remaining four insurers having written between four and sixteen policies each.9 3 Twenty-three insurers who had provided cover94
age in the last three years no longer do so, according to the study.
The Florida survey also found that the drop-off in coverage was
inversely proportional to the rise in damage awards.95 Between 1997
and 1999, settlements in the $1 to $250,000 range were fairly stable,
with 161 claims totaling $7.8 million in 1997 and 162 claims totaling
$6.8 million in 1999.96 However, in claims settled for over $250,000
the rise is startling. 1997 saw thirty-six claims that were settled for
$16.9 million, but by 1998 those numbers had risen to fifty-two claims
totaling $27.7 million, followed in 1999 by sixty-one claims with a
value of $29.3 million.9 7 While these figures are alarming from the
perspective of both the long-term health care industry, and their insurers, it should also be noted that in Florida, direct, as opposed to
vicarious, punitive damages are not insurable, and are wholly borne by
98
the nursing home if not reduced by the court.
Texas is experiencing the same type of insurance issues as Florida, because, like Florida, many of the laws designed to protect senior
92. See Best's Ins. News, Long-Term-Care Liability Market Continues to Shrink, Sept.
25, 2000.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. RICHARD L. BLATIT ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES 162 (1991).
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citizens, especially those in nursing homes, also lower the plaintiff's
burdens and shift attorney's fees to the defendant.9 9 Pennsylvania
nursing homes are also feeling the crunch as insurers manage the risk
outside of Florida and Texas. Gracedale Nursing Home, a 790-bed
facility in Northampton County, Pennsylvania recently learned that
their liability rate would be increased between 50% and 100%, which
made their coverage for the year ending October 1, 2000 a whopping
$215,515.0 Premiums at some Pennsylvania nursing homes have increased as much as 300%. l1o Given the comparative paucity of nurs-

ing home liability insurers, it appears that the runaway damage awards
in some states like Florida and Texas are raising the costs for nursing
homes nationwide, who must necessarily pass some of the costs on to
the patients. 102
A more recent report, conducted as an actuarial analysis of the
cost of general and professional liability claims trends in Florida's
long-term care industry, paints an even bleaker picture than before. 1'
Among the study's findings, Florida has an annual cost per nursing
home bed 12 times the national average.' °4 Driving this disparity is
that while Florida accounts for only 10% of all nursing home beds in
the United States, it accounts for 44% of the total losses reported, and
more that half of all losses reported in the last five years.1 0 5 Additionally, nursing home operators in Florida withstand over four claims to
every one in the rest of the nation.1 6 "Loss costs'' t ° 7 in the United
States have increased at an annual-rate of 22% over the last decade,
but in Florida during the same period there has been a 45% increase
99. See Best's Insurance News, Long-Term-Care Liability Market Continues to Shrink,
Sept. 25, 2000.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See Aon Risk Consultants, Inc., FloridaLong Term Care General and ProfessionalLiability Actuarial Analysis (visited Apr. 5, 2001) <http://www.fhca.org>. This report was done at
the request of the Florida Health Care Association, a nursing home industry trade group.
The data compiled included approximately 17,000 "non-zero" claims from several facilities
that operate approximately 33,000 nursing home beds, which is 20% of the beds nationwide. The comparison between Florida and the rest of the country is based on three factors: the number of claims reported (frequency), the size of claims (severity) and the
overall loss per exposure (loss cost). Id. at 1-2.
104. See id. at 3.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. "Loss costs" are defied as "[representing] the annual amount per occupied bed
expected to be paid to defend, settle and/or litigate GL/PL claims arising from incidents
occurring during the respective year." Id. at 25. "GL/PL" is general liability/professional
liability. Id. at 1.

2001]

NURSING HOME NEGLIGENCE TORT ACTIONS

385

per annum. t 8 The astronomical increases in loss costs seen in Florida
have made it nearly impossible for insurers to predict results, thus curtailing insurer willingness to write policies for Florida long-term care
providers."0 9 It is doubtful that these gigantic costs to the nursing
homes have benefited the intended recipients, the injured patients or
their families, because 47% of these costs are fees for lawyers, or costs
associated with litigation.'1 0 While Florida is not wholly representative
of the situation in all states, by virtue of its elder population, it should
be looked to as a harbinger of trends in long-term care.
IV.

CURRENT INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE CARE IN NURSING

HOMES NATIONWIDE

It would be easy to attribute the massive punitive damage awards
seen lately to the misfeasance of the long-term care industry, and conclude that the industry is merely being held accountable for their
egregious conduct and that juries are sending a message that substandard care of our elderly will not be tolerated. But is it enough to hold
the industry itself accountable, or are there other entities that bear
some responsibility for the current abysmal state of America's nursing
homes?
The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) has conducted several investigations over the past three years and found that
nearly one-third of California's 1,370 nursing homes have been cited
for violations classified as serious under federal or state standards."'
Nationwide problems in compliance and enforcement are similar to
California's. In testimony to Congress in 1999, the GAO reported that
neither complaint investigation nor enforcement options were being
used effectively and that serious problems in nursing homes go unre108. See id.
109. See Aon Risk Consultants, Inc., Hotida Long Term Care General and ProfessionalLiability Actuarial Analysis (visited Apr. 5, 2001) <http://www.fhca.org>.
110. See id.at 12.
111. See U.S. General Accounting Office, California Nursing Homes: Care Problems Persist Despite Federal and State Oversight, GAO/HEHS-98-202, July 27, 1998. This report
was support for testimony given on: California Nursing Homes: Federal and State Oversight Inadequate to Protect Residents in Homes With Serious Care Violations, GAO/THEHS- 98-219, July 28, 1998, in which GAO noted that among other things, "despite the
presence of a considerable federal and state oversight infrastructure, a significant number
of California nursing homes were not and currently are not sufficiently monitored to guarantee the safety and welfare of nursing home residents." The report also found that even
when violations are found, "California's DHS [Department of Health Services], consistent
with HCFA's [U.S. Health Care Financing Administration] guidance on imposing sanctions, grants 98 percent of noncompliant homes a 30- to 45-day grace period to correct
deficiencies without penalty, regardless of past performance." Id.
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ported or uninvestigated." 2 These problems have existed due to
combinations of poor state practices and limited Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) guidance and oversight.' 1 3 The lack of
guidance and oversight has resulted in policies or practices that actually limit the number of complaints filed, allowed serious complaints
to go univestigated for too long, and allowed compliance histories of
homes and states' complaint investigation performance reports that
were incomplete." 4 Further, GAO reported HCFA has not yet realized its goal of helping to ensure that homes maintain compliance
with federal health care standards."' GAO also reports that there is a
"yo- yo pattern" where homes continuously fall into and out of compliance; one-fourth of the nation's more than 17,000 nursing homes had
serious deficiencies that included inadequate prevention of pressure
sores, failure to properly assess residents' needs and provide correct
care, often with serious consequences, and failure to prevent
accidents.' 1 6
What is most striking about the reports on nursing home compliance is the recidivism of the violators and the ineffectiveness of sanctions. GAO testified that although most homes correct initial
discrepancies, 40% of the homes with serious deficiencies are repeat
violators.' ' 7 Further, the threat of sanctions had little effect on the
nursing homes due to the homes' ability to avoid actual fines as long
as temporary fixes were made to correct the deficiencies."'
Based on complaints from families about conditions, as well as
reports by GAO and other watchdog agencies, some states have begun
to take action to address the myriad problems in the long-term care
industry.1 1 California Governor Gray Davis plans to introduce several
measures that will increase fines for negligent care, provide higher
pay for nursing home workers, and provide more inspectors to investigate complaints. 20 Under Davis' proposal, nursing homes that negli112. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Nursing Homes: Stronger Complaint and Enforcement Practices Needed to Better Assure Adequate Care, GAO/T-HEHS-99-89, Mar.
22, 1999.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Nursing Homes: Stronger Complaint and Enforcement Practices Needed to Better Assure Adequate Care, GAO/T-HEHS-99-89, Mar.
22, 1999.
119. See infra notes 120-131 and accompanying text.
120. See Robert Salladay, Governor Gets Tough on Carefor The Elderly, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan.
9, 2000, at Al.
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gently cause the death of a patient would be fined $100,000, up from
$25,000, and fines for lesser offenses would be doubled from to a
range from $2,000 to $20,000.121 Under the new plan, nursing home
workers would get an additional 5% raise on top of the 5% increase
they received in 1999.122 The cost of the pay raise would be $68.5
million, but would help alleviate some of the difficulty that the health
care industry has in attracting and retaining quality workers. 12 3 The
plan also calls for fifty million dollars, mostly from federal sources, to
train nursing home workers.1 24 Davis also plans to add 200 new inspectors to augment the current staff of 253, with 133 of the new inspectors specifically detailed to providing surprise inspections of
specifically-targeted low-performing homes under a pilot program
that provides for state takeover of substandard homes.1 25 The measures also seek to reduce the response time to complaints from ten
1 26
days to forty-eight hours.
Florida has also taken steps to rectify some of the longstanding
problems in long-term care. Effective on July 1, 1999, Chapter 99394127 provides for a new system to detect problems earlier that includes the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA)
sending registered nurses they employ on unannounced visits to assess
the quality of care at nursing homes, 12' and further makes it illegal for
anyone to tip a home off about an impending visit.1 29 Complaint response times are decreased from a maximum time of ninety days to
sixty days.' 3 ° While this is a significant improvement, it is still inadequate, especially as compared to the California proposal, and fails to
acknowledge that once commenced, the degradation of health is
rapid in the most at-risk elderly patients. If a complaint is lodged for
egregious treatment, sixty days may be too long to wait to respond.
In addition to the reporting requirement changes, Florida has
taken steps to address the problem of recruitment and retention of
quality nursing home personnel. The state has allocated thirty-two
million dollars to allow homes to voluntarily increase staffing, and has
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See Robert Salladay, Governor Gets Tough on Carefor The Elderly, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan.
9, 2000, at Al.
127. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.0231 (West 1999).
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
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provided incentive in a $500 per day fine for nursing homes to not
drop below required staffing levels. 131 Whether the allocation is
enough, or enforcement for non-compliance occurs, will ultimately
determine the efficacy of the initiative.
The federal government has also stepped up efforts to increase
enforcement of nursing home standards. Former President Clinton
issued orders to "get tough" on violators, resulting in five times as
many fines being imposed in fiscal year 2000132 as were imposed in
1996, 1,000 up from 1999.13' The United States Court of Appeals for

the Tenth Circuit recently affirmed a penalty of $1,300 a day against a
nursing home in Utah that had allowed patients to develop pressure
sores, and another home in Cincinnati, Ohio was fined $153,000 for
unresponsiveness to patient needs and failure
to properly care for
34
infections.1
and
incontinence
sores,
pressure
Many of the homes found in violation of HCFA regulations are
being held accountable under the False Claims Act, 13 5 which gives the
Department of Justice the ability to prosecute substandard care that
was reimbursed under the Act.' 36 In Pennsylvania, two homes settled
cases by paying fines of $80,000 apiece, agreeing to temporary managers, and paying for federal monitors who will visit monthly to assess
the quality of care.'3 7 A third home payed a $60,000 fine and agreed
to pay for $100,000 in upgrades in lighting, air-conditioning, and
other equipment.

138

The government crackdown has also provided a deterrent to lax
state officials and unscrupulous nursing home operators. Brent VanMeter, former deputy commissioner of the Oklahoma Health Department, and a nursing home owner were convicted of federal bribery
charges in October 2000, in a case that involved certain nursing
homes receiving favorable treatment in exchange for bribes.' 3 9 Government diligence in all agencies with responsibility for nursing
homes in any capacity will serve to improve care for the patients, improve use of taxpayer funding, and improve the industry itself.

131. See id.
132. The Federal Government's fiscal year ends on September 30.
133. See Robert Pear, U.S. Toughens Enforcement of Nursing Home Standards, N. Y. TIMES
(Dec. 4, 2000) <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/O4/national/04NURS.html>.
134. See id.
135. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (West 1994).
136. See Pear, supra note 133.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
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V.

ANALYSIS

Increased oversight, more frequent and rigorous inspections,
training programs for nursing home workers, and increased fines will
all help improve the standards of care in nursing homes.1 4 ° However,
these measures will still fall short if statutory punitive damage caps in
nursing home negligence cases are not enacted. There are two considerations that must be part of the calculus of the health of the longterm care industry.
The unique nature of the industry is the most important concept
when considering accountability of nursing homes. This is an industry that is absolutely vital on a personal level to not only the 1.6 million residents of nursing homes, but to their families as well. It is in
the government's best interest that the industry be viable and healthy.
In order to avoid a crisis in long-term health care, the government
should necessarily turn to the industry. Industry profits, as long as
they are realized after quality care is rendered, are key to the desire of
the for-profit entities to continue in the business, to provide their investors and shareholders a reasonable return, to provide funds for
capital improvements and equipment purchases as well as the building of new homes to meet the burgeoning demands of the coming
decades. 1 ' Forcing nursing homes into bankruptcy due to massive
punitive damage awards benefits no one.' 4 2
The second consideration must be that while nursing homes are
held accountable for their actions, punitive damages must ultimately
140. See supra notes 119-139 and accompanying text.
141. See Joseph T. Resor, Troubled Times Don't Necessarily Mean Doom and Gloom, NURSING HOMES, Mar. 1, 2000. Declining market capitalization in equity markets has retarded
growth in building new long-term care facilities and upgrading existing buildings. See id.
In 1996, the market capitalization for publicly held skilled-nursing home entities was $13
billion, but by October 1999, that figure had fallen to only $2.3 billion. See id.
142. Nursing home trade groups frequently point to cuts in Medicare disbursements as
the primary reason for nursing home bankruptcies. See Florida Health Care Association,
Sixth Nursing Home Company Bankruptcy Places More Than 19,000 FloridaNursing Home Beds At
Risk, Jun. 23, 2000, (visited Apr. 16, 2001) <http://www.fhca.org/fhca/news/presre16.
php3>. However, the General Service Administration (GAO) reported to Congress on
September 5, 2000 that aggregate Medicare payments for covered nursing home costs are
likely to cover those costs, and that nursing home operators have failed to reevaluate business policies, which more likely put financial strain on those long-term care operations. See
U.S. General Accounting Office, Nursing Homes: Aggregate Medicare Payments Are Adequate
Despite Bankruptcies, GAO/HEHS-00-192, Sep. 5, 2000. The truth perhaps lies in between
the industry view and that of the GAO. The Aon Risk Consultant report found that while
the Medicare reimbursement rate in Florida had gone from $86 per day in 1995 to $114
per day in 2000, the increase has been totally unrealized as profit due to rising liability
costs. See Aon Risk Consultants, Inc., FloridaLong Term Care General Liability and Professional
Liability Actuarial Analysis (visited Apr. 5, 2001) <http://www.fhca.org>.
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advance the legitimate state interest in punishment and deterrence. 4
The punishment effect of massive punitive damages is unquestionable, and should neither be excessive nor enter the "zone of arbitrariness" that is violative of the Due Process Clause.' 4 4 Punitive damages
should also serve the legitimate state interest of deterring incidents of
the type that have been seen. Many of these cases seem to accept
deterrence as a legitimate state interest without scrutiny.
Cases that reach a jury depicting graphic, heart-wrenching evidence about the maltreatment and neglect of on elder person at the
hands of a nursing home do not happen by accident. This author
argues that much of the negligence occurring in the nation's nursing
homes is at least partially attributable to the woefully inadequate government oversight of nursing homes at both the state and federal
level.' 4 5 In Spilman, the court found that the nursing home knew
when inspections would be conducted, and increased staffing, cleanliness, and the overall appearance of the facility in anticipation. 146 One
wonders how Mr. Spilman would have been treated had the state of
Florida been conducting surprise inspections as they now plan to do.
From the Spilman case on, Florida, and indeed the rest of the nation,
was on notice that the system designed to protect some of the weakest
of our society was not working. The judges in Spilman castigated the
147
defendants, but mention nothing of the responsibility of the state.
If the state of Florida, as the court found, 141 was so remiss in their duty
of inspection, then was there truly a legitimate state interest shown?
The question of punitive damages in nursing home negligence
cases must inquire as to whether a legitimate state interest exists if the
state never acted in its regulatory capacity to prevent the occurrence
of an event which prompted the cause of action that results in the
punitive damages. In other words, was the defendant on notice that
their actions were so egregious as to warrant a multimillion dollar punitive award if they had never even been fined a few thousand dollars
for that conduct?. 49 From the standpoint of the victims of nursing
143. See BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
144. See id,
145. See supra notes 111-118 and accompanying text.
146. See Beverly Enterprises-Florida v. Spilman, 661 So. 2d 867, 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
5th Dist. 1995).
147. See id. at 874. In a special concurrence Judge W. Sharp comments that "I only write
to say we should never cease to be shocked by Man's inhumanity to Man. . . ." Id.
148. See id at 871. In the home where Spilman was cared for, the court found that
advance notice of inspections was used to clean up the home. See id. Yet, nowhere in its
opinion does the court take the state to task for a system that allows word of impending
inspections to leak out.
149. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 584.
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home neglect and their families, a timely, conscientious inspection by
state regulators who impose a fine, and then ensure collection of the
fine is preferable to the death of the victim and a lawsuit to remedy
the damages.
As punitive damages are capped in cases of maltreatment of elderly patients by statute, the fines levied should increase. As indicated,
the fines imposed by the federal government have the effect of changing nursing home behavior, but it is the support of the fines with scrutiny and oversight that forces the nursing homes to come up to
standards. 5 ° Additionally, by forcing a nursing home to spend its
money on infrastructure improvements, instead of that money going
to the estate of a decedent and the estate's lawyer, government action
directly improves the quality of life for the residents. This method
also allows plaintiffs to prove adequate notice using the standard in
BMW Nursing homes that have already paid fines will be on notice of
the severity or the reprehensibility of the offense.' 5 1 With caps on
punitive damages in place, the disparity between actual damages and
punitive damages will be lessened,' 5 2 and the difference between the
penalties in civil cases and any punitive damage award will be
53
reduced.1

Another consideration regarding punitive damages is where
those damages go when paid. Most states have some provision for at
least a portion of the damages to go to the state in some form. In
Florida, for example, only 40% of any punitive damage award goes to
the injured party.'5 4 If the cause of action is based on wrongful death
or personal injury, the remaining 60% goes to the Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund, otherwise the monies go to the General Revenue
Fund.155 It must be remembered that in Florida many of the nursing
home negligence suits are patient's rights causes of action, and not
personal injury or wrongful death, which do have statutory caps on
punitive damages. It would be sound policy to create a Nursing Home
Trust Fund from punitive damages that are awarded in nursing home
negligence cases. Under such a scheme, 50% of the punitive damage
award would go to the fund if the plaintiff is surviving, but 90% would
go to the fund if the plaintiff is a relative or the estate of the victim.
With the money flowing into state coffers as a result of these punitive
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See
See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 135-138 and accompanying text.
BMW,517 U.S. at 575.
id.
id.
RICHARD L. BLATT ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES 159 (1991).
id.
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damage awards that arguably are the partial result of the state's failure
to police the nursing home industry, it begs the question of whether
states have been indirectly enriched by and through the suffering of
those they had a duty to protect.
CONCLUSION

Punitive damages are a reactive correction for egregious behavior. Stiff fines, properly applied, and diligent oversight by the government are pro-active preventative measures that will save lives. The
federal government and the states must exert a concerted effort to
provide meaningful oversight of nursing homes, and properly apply
sanctions when needed to assure that "older Americans" receive the
best care possible. Additionally, the government must form a partnership with the long-term care industry that defines each other's roles
and engenders a spirit of cooperation. The United States can ill-afford any additional time wasted on ineffective oversight or negligent
nursing home operations.
Punitive damages that are tens of millions of dollars do not benefit anyone but the plaintiff's lawyers.' 5 6 While damages of that magnitude cause nursing homes to take notice, often the absurdity of the
award obscures the message the jury is attempting to send. For the
affected nursing home, an award of this magnitude signals costly appeals, reductions in spending for patients and staff, or in some cases,
bankruptcy.' 5 7 Often all three results occur. It cannot be best for the
patients they serve or the community in which they operate for a nursing home to have to pay out a multimillion dollar award. If the longterm care entity goes out of business the residents will have to find
new places to live, or perhaps the government will step in. Governmental takeover of a nursing home, however, guarantees no better
treatment, and possibly any neglect in a governmental run home
would not be actionable under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 5 8
156. SeeJulie Appleby, Litigation Grows in Ailing NursingHome Industry, USA TODAY, Jun.
19, 2000, at B8. In Florida, suing nursing homes has become a legal specialty, with leading
plaintiff's attorneys from Florida opening branch offices in Texas, Alabama, and Tennessee. Id.
157. See supra notes 103-109 and accompanying text. See supra note 142.
158. See Carter, Jr. Administrator of the Estate of Vance Carter v. Chesterfield County
Health Comm'n, 527 S.E. 2d 783 (Va. 2000) where the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed
dismissal of a suit against a county-run nursing home, holding that the home was under the
umbrella of sovereign immunity because the operation of a nursing home was a government function, and in effect a "police power" for the common good, and thus not a proprietary function.
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As the case law illustrates, there is no substitute for frequent inspections which probably could preclude some of the pain and suffering and early death described. Additionally, the massive awards have
continued to grow unabated despite the previous awards, so the deterrent effect is lost. It is presumably more of a deterrent to any business
to have diligent, qualified government officials closely scrutinizing the
business' actions.
Without cessation of the giant punitive damage awards, it is clear
that there may soon be no insurers left to provide liability insurance to
nursing home. With deductibles as high as $250,000 per incident'
and annual premiums in excess of $200,00016o it may eventually be
more cost effective for a nursing home to risk not having liability in-

surance coverage and save the money since one incident might well
mean a cost of $500,000 when including premiums in a given year.
Without some kind of statutory brake, the financial woes incurred
from punitive damages will leave the nursing home industry in shambles. Already companies which own one-fifth of the beds serving Florida's 84,000 nursing home residents are under Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection, with about 100 facilities near closure."'

Legislative efforts and regulatory efforts are providing some modicum of relief and may signal the beginning of a turnaround in the
nursing home industry, but the specter of massive punitive award
damages will continue to be a potential cost that saps resources from
nursing homes budgets in the form of higher insurance premiums
and attorneys fees. Assistance with recruitment and retention of registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, and Certified Nurse Assistants

(CNA) is crucial. These shortages are most crucial among CNAs who
work at nursing homes, and these shortages have been linked to abuse
1
and neglect of patients. 62
Surprise inspections and fines that are not only imposed, but collected, also appear to be providing better care to patients, which ulti159. See Mary Ellen Klas, Many Nursing Home Insurers Leaving State, PALM BEACH POST,
Sept. 22, 2000, at ID.
160. See Best's Ins. News, Long-Term-Care Liability Market Continues to Shrink, Sept.
25, 2000.
161. See Adam Miller, Angels of Death (visited Feb. 22, 2001) http://www.floridabiz.com/
cgi-shl/shownews.pl?id=6936.
162. SeeJennifer Steinhauer, Shortage of Health Care Workers Keeps Growing, N. Y. TIMES,
Dec. 25, 2000, <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/25/nyregion/25/HEAL.html>. The
article also reports that patient to nurse ratios in the New York City area that used to be 7:1
are now routinely 10 or 11:1 on day shift and as high as 40:1 on the night shift. Additionally, it is taking about nine months to fill positions that used to take three to six months to
fill in the past.
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mately benefits the nursing home industry. 61 As long as the industry
remains a for-profit business, it will be imperative that the public is
confident in the government's ability to police the industry. If nursing homes are closely watched, and fail to comply with government
regulation, then the government must step in to hold nursing home
administrators personal liable and enforce criminal sanctions against
those who harm elderly patients or those in authority who knowingly
fail to stop the abuses. The needs of the patient, which necessarily
include the home in which they live staying open, must be the first
priority. Statutory caps on punitive damages will go a long way in aiding a beleaguered industry to remain viable to serve the needs of the
present while preparing for the increased needs of the future. The
American public can no longer accept government that reacts at a
glacial pace to nursing home abuses and waits for the courts to rectify
the injustice, but must demand a pro-active approach that prevents
abuse from ever happening.

163. See infra notes 133-139 and accompanying text.

